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CASENOTE
The Future of High-Level Nuclear
Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and

the Tenth Amendment: Nevada v.
Watkins
INTRODUCTION
The federal government's monopoly over America's nuclear
energy production began during World War II with the birth of the

Atomic Age.'

During the next thirty years, nuclear waste inventories

increased with minor congressional concern.' In the early 1970s, the need
for federal legislation to address problems surrounding nuclear waste
regulation, along with federal efforts to address these problems, became
critical? Previous federal efforts had completely failed to address nuclear
waste disposal. In 1982, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(NWPA)4 to deal with issues of nuclear waste management and disposal,
and to set an agenda for the development of two national high-level
nuclear waste repositories.5
The NWPA is a comprehensive federal statute which governs the

disposal of spent fuel6 produced by the nation's private nuclear power
plants and high-level 7 radioactive waste generated by nuclear weapons

plants.8 The NWPA requires the United States Secretary of the

Department of Energy (Secretary) to establish guidelines used to site,
construct, and operate permanent disposal repositories for the nation's
1. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,63 (1978); see Act
of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, 60 Stat. 755.
2. H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, pt.1, at 26, (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792.
3. H.R. REP. No. 491, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, pt.1, at 28-29, (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3794-3795.
4. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (1989)).
5. Jeffrey D. Raeber, Comment, Federal Nuclear Waste Policy as Defined by the Nuclear
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 111,116(1989).
6. Spent fuel is defined as "fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor
following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been separated by
reprocessing." 42 U.S.C. § 10101(23)(1989).
7. High-level radioactive waste is "the highly radioactive material resulting from the
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel" 42 U.S.C. § 10101 (12)(A).
8. Texas v. United States Dept. of Energy, 754 F.2d 550, 551 (5th Cir. 1985).
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high-level nuclear waste.' Aware of the profound regional opposition
that would make siting a single repository difficult, Congress anticipated
that one facility would be located in a western state and the second in a
eastern state.0 Congress provided that two repositories would be
opened--one by 1998 and a second by 2003."
In 1987, after the Secretary's efforts to site the first repository
became bogged down, Congress amended the NWPA12 thereby directing
the Secretary to conduct exclusive site characterization 3 at one
site-Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Nevada officials immediately challenged
the federal government's constitutional authority to single out Yucca
Mountain in the site selection process. In Nevada v. Watkins, the United
States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 1987 NWPA
amendments were enacted in accordance with the United States
Constitution. 4 The Watkins Court ruled that the 1987 Amendments,
which effectively designated Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole site for
investigation of possible development of the nation's first and only
high-level nuclear waste repository, were a valid exercise of congressional
power and they did not violate the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution. s
The current interpretation of the Tenth Amendment suggests that
states do not have the right to challenge federal legislation on substantive
grounds. 6 This interpretation implies that where the political process

9. 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b)(1)(1989).
10. Pub. L. No. 97-425, § 114(a)(2)(A), 96 Stat. 2201, 2214(1983) (repealed 1987).

11.

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND

POLICY 414 (1992).
12. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330
(1987) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10133-10136, 10172, amending 42 U.S.C. §
10101-10270 (1989)).
13. The term "site characterization" means
(A) siting research activities with respect to a test and evaluation facility
at a candidate site; and
(B) activities, whether in the laboratory or in the field, undertaken to
establish the geologic condition and the ranges of the parameters of a
candidate site relevant to the location of a repository, including borings,
surface excavations, excavations of exploratory shafts, limited subsurface
lateral excavations and borings, and in situ testing needed to evaluate the
suitability of a candidate site for the location of a repository, but not
including preliminary borings and geophysical testing needed to assess
whether site characterization should be undertaken.
42 U.S.C. § 10101 (21)(1989).
14. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1554 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
(1991), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1225 (1991).
15. Id. at 1556-57.
16. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) ("Garcia holds that the limits
(on congressional power] are structural not substantive-for example, that States must find
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should protect a state's interest, the Tenth Amendment creates procedural
protections for states when the political process fails. If the 1987
Amendments constituted a failure of the political process, Nevada could
have possibly obtained relief under the Tenth Amendment. Nevertheless,
the Watkins Court's decision authorized the Secretary to continue site
characterization at Yucca Mountain.
Watkins is the first major constitutional test faced by the NWPA
and it is likely that Nevada will challenge NWPA again in the future.
While this article assumes the constitutionality of the 1987 NWPA
Amendments, it examines whether the Tenth Amendment reserves
Nevada the right to restrict the nation's high-level nuclear waste from
being stored in Nevada should site characterization establish Yucca
Mountain suitable for housing the nation's first and only high-level
nuclear waste repository.
BACKGROUND
Before 1954, the federal government maintained exclusive
authority over the use, control,' and ownership of all nuclear
technology. 7 To better serve the national interest, Congress enacted the
Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 195418 to further private sector nuclear
energy development for peaceful purposes under a program of federal
regulation and licensing. 9 The AEA created the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), whose purpose included the supervised construction,
ownership, and operation of commercial nuclear reactors.' The AEC
was given exclusive authority to control materials and facilities involved
in the manufacturing of nuclear energy for military and nonmilitary
purposes." With the passage of the AEA, federal regulation continued
to dominate the nuclear energy field such that "no significant role was
contemplated for the States."
In 1959 Congress amended the AEA to increase the state's role in

their protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not
through judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity."); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) ("State sovereign interests, then, are
more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal
system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.")
17. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990).
18. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 100-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2017 (1988)).
19. English, 496 U.S. at 78.
20. Id. (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63
(1978)).
21. English, 496 U.S. at 78.
22. Id.
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the development of nuclear energy and to define the responsibilities "of
the States and the [Federal Government] with respect to the regulation of
by-product, source, and special nuclear materials. " ' The 1959
amendments authorized the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to
enter into agreements with state governors to transfer the federal
government's regulatory control over certain nuclear materials to the
states under limited conditions. 4 Under the AEA amendments, states
could regulate certain nuclear materials provided that state regulatory
programs were "coordinated and compatible" with NRC regulations.'
In 1974 Congress enacted the Energy Reorganization Act (ERA)'
to further ensure that the hazards associated with nuclear energy
production were safely regulated.27 The ERA transferred the AEC's duty
to regulate nuclear materials and license nuclear power plants to the
NRC,' and the AEC's goal to promote and develop commercial nuclear
energy to the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA).' The NRC and the ERDA were to collaborate in the
development of safety standards for high-level nuclear waste
regulation." The ERA granted the NRC greater control over the number
and range of safety responsibilities involving nuclear energy
production. 3'
While the AEC, NRC, and the ERDA were rather successful in
encouraging commercial nuclear energy development, they failed to
confront the demand for safe disposal of nuclear energy by-products.'
It became evident that "profits from the private exploitation of atomic
energy were uncertain and the accompanying risks substantial."'
Federal policy concerning safe nuclear waste disposal was largely in
disarray. Faced with the dangerous accumulation and storage of

23. Id., (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1)(1982 ed.)).
English, 496 U.S. 78.
Id., (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(1)(1982 ed.)).
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801 (1974).
English, 496 U.S. at 78-79.
28. Id. at 2276.
29. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Dev. Comm'n.,
461 U.S. 190, 221 (1983).
30. In 1977, Congress transferred the ERDA's functions to the Department of Energy.
42 U.S.C. § 7151(a) (Supp. IV 1976). Congress gave the Department of Energy the
responsibility for "the establishment of temporary and permanent facilities for the storage,
management, and ultimate disposal of nuclear wastes." 42 U.S.C. § 7133(a)(8)(c).
31. English, 4% U.S. 78.
32. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
(1991), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1225 (1991).
33. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63, 438 U.S. at
63 (1978); see Harold P. Green, Nuclear Power: Risk, Liability, and Indemnity, 71 MIcH. L. REv.
24.
25.
26.
27.

479 (1973).
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high-level nuclear waste in on-site containers at commercial nuclear
power plants throughout the nation, Congress enacted the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA).34 With the NWPA, Congress assumed
federal responsibility and formulated a comprehensive federal plan
designed to locate and establish, by the next century, operation of a
permanent repository for commercial spent fuel and high-level nuclear
waste.'5
The NWPA statutory scheme instructs the Secretary to establish
general site characterization guidelines for the development of nuclear
waste repositories.5 Under these guidelines, the Secretary is required to
nominate to the President five candidate sites suitable for housing the
first repository." Before the Secretary commences any site
characterization, the DOE is required to prepare draft environmental
assessments (EA's)' to accompany site nominations. From the five sites
nominated, the Secretary is to recommend the three most suitable sites to
the President." Each site approved by the President would subsequently
undergo further intensive EAs to determine the ideal site for housing the
first repository.'" Following the first five nominations, the NWPA
requires the Secretary to nominate five additional sites, including three
not previously nominated. 4 ' From these five additional sites, the
Secretary is to recommend to the President three sites deemed suitable for
housing the second repository.' The NWPA requires that the Secretary
site a repository in different geographic regions of the country.'
The NWPA authorizes the President, in his discretion, to approve
or disapprove each site recommended to him by the Secretary." If the
President approves a candidate site, he is required to submit a

34. Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10241-10270 (1989)); see David H. Topol, Note, Rethinking Who
Is Left Holding the Nation's Nuclear Garbage Bag: The Legal and Policy Implications of Nevada v.
Watkins, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 791 (1991).
35. 42 U.S.C § 10131(b)(1982).
36. Id. § 10132(a).
37. Id. § 10132(b)(1)(a).
38. An environmental assessment is "a detailed assessment of the basis for such
recommendation and of the probable impacts of the site characterization activities planned
for such site, and a discussion of alternative activities ... that may be [done] to avoid such
impacts." 42 U.S.C. § 10132(b)(1)(d).
39. Id. § 10132(b)(1)(B).
40. Id. § 10133(a).
41. Id. § 10132(b).
42. Id. § 10132(b)(1)(B).
43. James Davenport, The Federal Structure: Can Congress Commander Nevada to Participate
in its FederalHigh Level Waste DisposalProgram?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 539 (1993).
44. 42 US.C. § 10132(c) (1982).
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recommendation of the site to Congress.4' If Congress approves the site
as suitable for license application, the affected State could then submit a
notice of disapproval to Congress.* Congress then has ninety days to
pass a joint resolution overriding the affected State's notice of
disapproval.47 If Congress fails to override the State's disapproval notice,
the NWPA requires the President to submit to Congress another site
recommendation. ' Once Congress selects a site, the Secretary is to
submit a license application to the NRC for site development.4
Repository construction would commence once the NRC approves the
license application.s' With the original NWPA procedures, Congress
anticipated that the first national high-level nuclear waste repository
would begin operation around 1995.'1
In 1984, pursuant to the NWPA, the Secretary issued general
guidelines for the recommendation of repository sites. 2 Within a week,
the Secretary conducted EAs at nine possible sites in six states.' The list
of possible sites included Yucca Mountain. In 1986, the Secretary
nominated Yucca Mountain, along with other candidate sites in four
states, for consideration as the first repository. ' The affected states
immediately challenged the Secretary's decision with litigation against the
Department of Energy (DOE), asserting numerous violations of NWPA
provisions relating to state participation in the decisionmaking process."
On May 28, 1986, Nevada officials filed a petition with the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, challenging the Secretary's initial site characterization
at Yucca Mountain.' Nevada officials claimed that the Secretary's site
investigations were contrary to law based on the Secretary's failure to
establish jurisdiction over Yucca Mountain by state cession or consent,
pursuant to the Federal Enclave Clause. 7 The Secretary continued the

45. Id. § 10134(a)(2).
46. Id. § 10136.
47. Id. § 10135.
48. H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 3, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3792.
49. Id.
50. Nevada v. Herrington, 827 F.2d 1394, 1396-1397 (9th Cir. 1987).
51. H.R. REP. No. 491, supra note 3, at 31, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3792.
52. 10 C.F.R. § 960.3 (1989).
53. The Secretary nominated sites in Louisiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, Utah, and
Washington. 49 Fed. Reg. 49540-41 (Dec. 20, 1984).
54. The Secretary nominated Richard Dome, Mississippi, Yucca Mountain, Nevada,
Deaf Smith County, Texas, Davis Canyon, Utah, and Hanford, Washington. 51 Fed. Reg.
19,783-84 (June 2, 1986).
55. Mark E. Rosen, Note, Nevada v. Watkins:Who Gets the Shaft, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 239,
255-256 (1991).
56. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1550.
57. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl.17 and the applicable NRC Regulation, 10 C.F.R.
§ 60.121 (1995)).

Winter 19961

HIGH LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL

site selection process nonetheless and subsequently narrowed the list of
candidate sites to three potential sites.' Yucca Mountain was again
listed as a possible site. The Secretary then recommended to President
Reagan three sites ideal for housing a high-level nuclear waste
repository.? President Reagan reviewed and approved the three
recommended sites.'a
The same day President Reagan approved the three
recommended sites, the Secretary disclosed that plans for a second
repository were delayed indefinitely because of the "uncertainty of when
a second repository might be needed."6 Frustrated with the expense and
delay of the siting process, Congress amended the NWPA by way of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987. The 1987 amendments were
passed before the Secretary could begin intense site characterization at the
three sites approved by President Reagan.62 The 1987 amendments
directed the Secretary to begin site characterization at Yucca Mountain
and to cease investigation at all other potential sites.' The future of
national nuclear waste disposal was completely aimed at Nevada.
In 1988, the Secretary issued his final site characterization plan
which included continued site characterization at Yucca Mountain.6
Pursuant to Nevada law, the Secretary submitted applicable
environmental applications to conduct further site characterization at
Yucca Mountain to various Nevada state agencies.' In 1989, while the
applications were pending, the Nevada legislature, pursuant to the
NWPA,6 passed two joint resolutions which opposed the placement of
any high-level nuclear waste repository in Nevada without the approval
of the Nevada Legislature.' On April 19, 1989, both resolutions were
transmitted to the President and both Houses of Congress.6s Congress
failed to respond to Nevada's transmittal.' In addition, Nevada
Governor Bob Miller signed into law on July 6, 1989, Assembly Bill 222
58. The Secretary narrowed the list of candidate sites to Yucca Mountain, Nevada, Deaf
Smith County, Texas and Hanford, Washington. 51 Fed. Reg. 19,783-84 (June 2, 1986).
59. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. E.P.A., 824 F.2d 1258, 1262 (1st Cir.
1987).
60. Nevada v. Herrington, 827 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1987).
61. Charles H. Montage, FederalNuclear Waste DisposalPolicy, 27 NAT. RESOURcES J.309,
398 (1987).
62. See Samuel J. Light, Public Lands, 21 ENVTL. L. 1207, 1209 (1991).
63. Nevada v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1991).
64. Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 906
(1991), reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1225 (1991).
65. Id.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 10135(b) (1982).
67. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1550-1551.
68. Id. at 1551.
69. Id.
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which provides that "lilt is unlawful for any person or governmental
entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada."' 0 With the
passage of its joint resolutions and Assembly Bill 222, Nevada made its
unyielding opposition to the placement of any high-level nuclear waste
repository within Nevada clear to the federal government.
On November 1, 1989, the Nevada State Attorney General issued
an opinion concluding that Nevada had submitted a valid disapproval
notice pursuant to NWPA guidelines when both of Nevada's Joint
Resolutions were delivered to Congress.' The opinion further concluded
that congressional inaction approved Nevada's disapproval notice.' The
Nevada Attorney General then advised the Governor that, based on
Nevada's actions, the Secretary's permit applications should not be issued
because they were moot.' Governor Miller sent the Secretary a letter
dated November 14, 1989, which declared that Yucca Mountain site
characterization should cease because geologic information concluded
that Yucca Mountain was unfit for a repository and the Nevada
Legislature and Governor had effectively vetoed the selection of the
Yucca Mountain site.'4
On November 29, 1989, the Secretary advised Congress that
Yucca Mountain site characterization should continue as planned.' In
December 1989, however, Nevada administrative agencies informed the
Secretary that his environmental applications were being denied based on
the actions of the Nevada Legislature and the Nevada Attorney General's
opinion letter which stated that "these applications are now moot because
the Yucca Mountain Repository is prohibited."'6
Unable to reach an agreement with the Secretary, Nevada officials
filed a second, separate petition on January 5, 1990 requesting review of
the Secretary's actions with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals."
Nevada disputed the Secretary's failure to halt further site
characterization at Yucca Mountain, insisting that state officials submitted
a valid disapproval notice and that current information disqualified the
site.' On February 2, 1990, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
Nevada's petition to review the Secretary's authority to nominate Yucca
Mountain and Nevada's petition to review the Secretary's authority to

70. NEv. REV. STAT. § 459.910 (1989).
71.

Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1551.

72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id.
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continue site characterization at Yucca Mountain consolidated."
While Nevada's petitions raised several issues, Nevada's primary
objection was that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to
amend the NWPA in 1987, and even if it did, the Tenth Amendment
limited Congress' authority to designate Yucca Mountain.' The Watkins
Court found, however, that the Property Clause8' provided Congress
with the constitutional authority to enact the 1987 amendments.' Since
Yucca Mountain is federally owned land, the Court concluded that
Congress had plenary power under the Property Clause to regulate the
land's use.' Therefore, the court held that the amendments were a
valid exercise of congressional power under the Property Clause.
After finding that the amendments were a valid exercise of
congressional power, the Court analyzed Nevada's Tenth Amendment
argument. Relying on current Tenth Amendment analysis, Nevada
officials based their Tenth Amendment argument on the procedurally
defective process." Nevada claimed that the 1987 amendments were the
exact procedural defect envisioned by the United States Supreme Court
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.85 Nevada
maintained that their Tenth Amendment right to participate in the
national political process was violated because Nevada was not
represented in the House and Senate Conference Committee on the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 when the committee ratified
the 1987 NWPA amendments.'
Moreover, Nevada officials argued that the political process failed
to protect Nevada's autonomy because in the absence of Nevada officials,
powerful politicians from other candidate states enacted new NWPA
legislation by attaching an appropriations bill to the 1987 Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act without bicameralism or presentment.'
Nevada officials claimed that as a result of the 1987 amendments, Nevada
was singled out in a manner that left it politically isolated and powerless,
and that this was a total departure from "acceptable [federalism)
principles envisioned by the framers."
The Watkins Court, however, found that Nevada could not point

79. Id.

80. Id. at 1552, 1556.
2.
81. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
82. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1552-53.
83. Id. at 1552.
84. Id. at 1556.
85. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 43 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (No. 82-1913, 82-1951) (1985) thereinafter Petitioner'sOpening Brief .
86. Id. at 40.
87. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1557.
88. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 39.
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to any political process defect in the enactment of the 1987 NWPA
amendments.9 Relying on Garciaand recent Tenth Amendment caselaw,
the Watkins Court concluded that Nevada's lack of political strength
resulted from the "Great Compromise" of the Constitutional Convention
of 1787 in which each state was guaranteed equal representation in the
Senate and proportionate representation in the House of
Representatives."
In addition, the Watkins Court found that Nevada's claim that its
lack of representation on the Conference Committee created a defect in
the political process was groundless since the Conference Committee
membership was established pursuant to Article I, section 5, clause 2, of
the United States Constitution which gives the House authority to
determine the rules of its proceedings." Thus, committee membership
is not a justiciable issue.' As a result, the Watkins Court stated that this
was not a political process defect contemplated by recent caselaw. 93
Finally, the Watkins Court found it difficult to accept Nevada's
Tenth Amendment claim that the 1987 amendments comprised a failing
in the political process since the NWPA contained a provision allowing
Nevada to register its disapproval of a repository siting decision." As
a result, the Watkins Court held that Congress acted within its
enumerated constitutional powers and that the Tenth Amendment did
not prohibit Congress from enacting the 1987 NWPA amendments which
designated Yucca Mountain as the sole repository site."
The Tenth Amendment
Under the Constitution, states have the inherent police power to
protect the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.' A state
may act pursuant to this power so long as it does not violate a specific
constitutional provision. On the other hand, the federal government is

89. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1556.
90. Id. at 1556-1557.
91. Id. at 1557 (citing Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983)) (committee membership is a power allocated to each House of
Congress pursuant to U.S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 5, cl.
2).
92. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1557.
93. Id. (citing EEOC v. Vermont, 904 F.2d 794, 802 (2d Cir. 1990)) ("In any event, the
absence of a given legislator or legislators, so long as the legislative body's appropriate
procedural rules have been followed, does not mean that the national process leading to the
enactment of a given piece of legislation was flawed.").
94. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1557.
95. Id.
96. Lyle D. Griffin, Comment, A Glimmerof Hopefor State Sovereignty: The Supreme Court
Limits FederalRegulation of Radioactive Waste Disposal, 23 CuMBs. L. REv. 655, 659 (1992).
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one of limited, enumerated powers.' To be legitimate, federal
governmental action must be within one of the enumerated powers and
must not be limited by the Constitution.' The heart of federalism exists
in various constitutional grants of authority to, and limitations on, both
federal and state governments.
One constitutional limitation on the federal government is the
Tenth Amendment. The Tenth Amendment states that "[tihe powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.""
The Tenth Amendment stands for the legal axiom of state sovereignty
and the common constitutional limit on federal power in the interest of
federalism. It is under this maxim that courts have balanced state rights
under the Tenth Amendment and the federal government's authority to
act pursuant to its enumerated constitutional powers.
From the time that the Constitution was first ratified, there has
been much debate on the role of the Tenth Amendment in state and
federal governmental relations. Early courts effectively avoided Tenth
Amendment controversy by allowing the federal government to regulate
private sector activity through the Commerce Clause"° and not state
activity in itself. 10 ' From 1936 to 1976, courts construed the Tenth
Amendment as void of any specific or enforceable guarantee that might
limit federal power."° It was in this sense that the Tenth Amendment
was considered a "[tiruism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered."'"
In 1968, the Court again analyzed the state sovereignty issue and
the Tenth Amendment in Maryland v. Wirtz."° Even though the Court
upheld expansion of federal regulation of the wages of state and
municipal wage earners, a significant dissent in support of state
sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment surfaced. Justice Douglas, in his
dissent which was joined by Justice Stewart, asserted that "what is done
here [is] nonetheless such a serious invasion of state sovereignty
protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent
with our constitutional federalism. " "lsThe echoes of Douglas' dissent
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 313 (ames Madison); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 405. (1819).
98. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
100. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
101. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 157 (12th ed. 1991).
102. William A. Hazeltine, NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES: A NEW RESTRICTION ON

CONGRESSIONAL POWER VIS-A-VIS THE STATES, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 237, 242 (1994).
103. U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
104. 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (Douglas & Stevens, JJ. dissenting).
105. Id. at 201.
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would arise eight years later.
In 1976, the Court finally established principles of state
sovereignty when it defined a new Tenth Amendment rule in National
League of Cities v. Usery."1° In National League of Cities, the Court, in a
five to four decision, effectively overruled Wirtz and held that the Tenth
Amendment barred the application of the federal minimum wage and
overtime pay standards of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state
government employees.1 0' The majority opinion determined that the
federal government had the power to regulate the minimum wage and
overtime pay standards of employees because the wage standards clearly
affected interstate commerce.1" The Court found, however, that the
Tenth Amendment invalidated the application of FLSA to state and local
government employees because FLSA displaced a state's power over
traditional local governmental functions and threatened their independent
existence."
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a sizable
amount of confusion concerning application of the Tenth Amendment.
From 1976 to 1985 the court regularly rejected challenges based on
National League of Cities and applied various Tenth Amendment tests: (1)
whether state interests outweighed federal interest; (2) whether the
federal statute regulated purely private activity; and (3) whether the
federal statute regulated states as states, whether it dealt with matters
that were indisputably attributes of state autonomy, and whether the
required state compliance with federal law would directly impair the
structural integrity of states in areas of traditional government
functions."0 It was during this time that the boundary of federal control
of state and local government activity appeared less certain.
In 1985, the Court again reduced the significance of the Tenth
Amendment when it decided Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

106. 426 US. 833 (1976).

107. Id. at 855.
108. Id. at 836, citing Darby v. United States, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
109. Id. at 852.
110. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association, 452 U.S. 264
(1981) (Tenth Amendment did not prevent federal statute from regulating the operation of
coal mines); E.E.O.C. v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (Tenth Amendment did not prevent
Age Discrimination in Employment Act from applying to state employees); United
Transportation Union v. Long Island Railroad Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (state-owned railroad
must comply with Railway Labor Act mediation and cooling off procedures because
application of federal law to state-owned business does not impair state ability "to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional functions"); F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982) (Tenth Amendment did not prevent the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act from
requiring state utilities commissions to consider certain standards and approaches in setting
policies and requiring state commissions to enforce federal standards), reh'g denied, 458 U.S.
1131 (1982).
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Authority."' In Garcia, the Court overruled National League of Cities and
held that the Tenth Amendment did not prohibit federal regulation of
wages and hours of employees of a municipal transit system."' In its
opinion, the Court stated that "state sovereign interests . . .are more
properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of
the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal
power." 3 After Garcia, the only remaining state sovereignty limit on
federal power is one of process and not one of result. Any substantive
limit on the national power must find its justification in the procedural
nature of the Constitution and it must be designed to compensate for
possible failings in the national political process.
Today, the Supreme Court will not employ the Tenth
Amendment to invalidate the application of federal law to state and local
governments. States must now convince Congress instead of the Court
that they should not be subject to federal regulation when such regulation
would impair their authority to function as states. Garciaand other recent
cases indicate that the Court might invalidate a federal statute if an
extraordinary defect existed in the national political process sufficient to
impair the integrity of the states. The Court, however, has yet to address
the precise nature of such a defect. When the issue arises, which Tenth
Amendment principle will Nevada face and will it be sufficient to protect
Nevada?
ANALYSIS
Recent Tenth Amendment interpretation has been tumultuous.
Contemporary scholars agree that "the Court is on weakest ground when
it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in the
interest of the states."'14 Scholars, such as Professor Herbert Weschler,
argue that if the Supreme Court is authorized to examine the limits of
federal legislative power, they would sit as a national policy making
body, thus overriding the balanced political process since each Justice
would employ their individual views of the federal system.11 It is,
therefore, difficult for the judiciary to use the Tenth Amendment to
validly circumscribe Congress' constitutional power."6

111. 469 US. 528 (1985).
112. Id. at 545.
113. Id. at 552.
114. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559, (1954).
115. Id.
116. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 23-24 (1959).
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According to Professor Weschler, Congress is better suited to
balance the national interests and determine the freedom of local7
government and the laws they might pass in the federal system."
Additionally, Congress is the most capable governmentalentity to resolve
disputes between various parts of the nation."18 Through Congress'
political structure, states can protect themselves against arbitrary acts by
the federal government through their independent influence." 9 This is
similar to the reasoning employed by the Garcia majority. In Garcia,the
majority declared that the structural layout of the government ensured
states protection from overreaching by the national government.'20 The
Court stated that the Framers sought to protect the states by providing
them a role in the selection of both the federal executive and legislative
branches. 2' Through this "federal system in which special restraints
inhered principally in the workings of the national government itself,
rather than in discrete limitations on the objects of federal authority,"
states would find their protection.'2 Because of this procedural
structure, the Court felt that intrusions on state autonomy would simply
not occur." Therefore, the Court concluded that it should not use the
Tenth Amendment to circumscribe Congress' power absent a defect in the
political process.2
This political process theory deeply troubled the dissenters in
Garcia. According to the Garcia dissent, the "[sitate's role in our system
of government is a matter of constitutional law, not of legislative
grace.'"1 5 Because of the majority's reasoning, the dissent claimed that
federal officials, invoking the Commerce Clause, would be the judges of
the limits of their own power-a result inconsistent with federalism
principles. 26 This result, the dissent argued, reduced the Tenth
Amendment to meaningless rhetoric whenever Congress acts pursuant to
the Commerce Clause.'27 According to the dissent, irrespective of the
political process, "the Tenth Amendment was adopted specifically to
ensure that the important role promised the States by the proponents of
the Constitution was realized. " '28 As Justice Powell stated,

117. Wechsler, supra note 115, at 547-548.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985).

121. Id. at 551.
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Id.at 552.
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Id. at 552.
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"contemporaneous writings and the debates at the ratifying conventions
make clear, the State's ratification of the Constitution was predicated on
this [Tenth Amendment protection] understanding of federalism.""2
Furthermore, as the dissent noted, the majority radically departed
from long-settled constitutional values and ignored the role of judicial
review in the federal system of government.'-, As Justice O'Connor
stated "[ilf federalism so conceived and so cultivated by the Framers...
is to remain meaningful, this court cannot abdicate its constitutional
responsibility to oversee the federal government's compliance with its
duty to respect the legitimate interests of the States."'' Additionally,
Justice Powell declared that "judicial enforcement of the Tenth
Amendment is essential to maintaining the federal system so carefully
designed by the Framers and adopted in the Constitution."132 According
to dissent, the majority's view of federalism appeared "to relegate states
to precisely the trivial role that the opponents of the Constitution feared
they would occupy.""
The role states were to have under the federal structure was to
be significant and respected by the federal government. Although the
Federalists maintained that the federal government would "have only the
powers expressly delegated to it... and that all other powers would be
reserved to the states," opponents of the Constitution were, nonetheless,
suspicious and feared that the national government would expand and
eventually usurp the role of states.'3 Accordingly, the Tenth
Amendment was added to put the obvious beyond conjecture. 35 As
Charles Jarvis told the delegates at the Massachusetts Convention, "[bly
positively securing what is not expressly delegated, it leaves nothing to
the uncertainty of conjecture, or to the refinements of implication, but is
an explicit reservation of every right and privilege which is nearest and
most agreeable to the people."'" The Tenth Amendment was designed
to put such fears to rest and this purpose was not to be defeated by
labeling it a truism. ' 7

129. Id.
130. Id. at 561.

131. Id. at 581.
132. Id. at 570.
133. Id. at 575.
134. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER'S DESIGN 79 (1987).
135. Id.
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WATKINS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS OF THE NWPA
The original NWPA of 1982 resulted from a political process
involving tremendous political and regional compromise, as well as an
agreement not to name any specific repository site.'" This compromise
stemmed from the fact that if a state was selected, that state's legislator
could restrict the state from being sited pursuant to the NWPA if his
constituents decided against a repository.' 3' Because of this
understanding, the NWPA gathered sufficient congressional support to
become federal law." When the DOE began the selection process,
however, it became less objective and more political. Congressional
members from certain states hurried to get their states removed from the
Secretary's list.' As a result, Congress reconsidered the NWPA in 1987.
The political process which lead to the 1987 NWPA Amendments
was unlike that of the original Act. The political process was partial and
benefited the other two prime candidate sites-Texas and
Washington." 2 Because of their political strength, both Texas and
Washington were able to unfairly influence federal legislation by
removing their respective sites, thus 'sticking it' to Nevada. The Nevada
delegation, on the other hand, was not strong enough to avoid the 1987
amendments. Moreover, Nevada was unable to prevent the amendments
since the Conference Committee, and not Congress, amended the
NWPA.4 When the Conference Committee met behind closed doors to
reconcile differences between underlying NWPA amendments, Nevada
was the only selected candidate state excluded.'" Through this political
process, many concerned states, including those with candidate sites,
were able to direct the nation's nuclear waste storage problems to
Nevada.
Even though the Watkins Tenth Amendment issue focused on the
manner in which the NWPA was amended, Watkins illustrates the
problems with the political process rationale that the Tenth Amendment
secures more than a state's right to participate through its elected officials
in the federal political process. Rather, as the Garcia dissenters indicate:

138. Topol, supra note 35, at 797.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 798.
142. Texas congressional members totaled twenty-nine, and included House Speaker Jim
Wright and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen. United States
Vice-President George Bush was also from Texas. Washington congressional members
totaled ten, and included Majority Leader Thomas Foley. Topol, supra note 35, at 800-801.
143. Watkins, 914 F.2d at 1557.
144. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 42-43.
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[Tihe harm to the states that results from Federal overreaching
under the Commerce Clause is not simply a matter of dollars
and cents. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 846-851. Nor is
it a matter of the wisdom or folly of certain policy choices. Cf.
ante, at 546. Rather by usurping functions traditionally
performed by the States, federal overreaching under the
Commerce Clause undermines the Constitutionally mandated
balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government, a balance designed to protect our fundamental
liberties.'
Under current Tenth Amendment analysis, the political process
does not protect Nevada. Rather, it limits Nevada's sovereignty as a State,
to restrict the long term storage of high-level nuclear waste produced in
forty-nine other states. Granted, Nevada has a direct influence on
Congress through its two senators and two representatives, as well as an
independent influence on the executive branch. That influence, however,
is limited. Nevada's political influence is not enough to effect the federal
government's decision to site a repository at Yucca Mountain. Absent the
Tenth Amendment, Nevada does not have the power to prohibit the
federal government from overreaching and placing a high-level nuclear
waste dump at Yucca Mountain. Indeed, under the amended NWPA,
Congress is the judge of the limits of its power.
Furthermore, the claim of the Watkins Court that the Tenth
Amendment analysis does not apply since the disapproval provision
protects Nevada's interests is a farce. While the NWPA provides Nevada
with a provision whereby it could register its disapproval of a repository
siting decision, it does not provide Nevada with the exact rights
guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. Clearly, Nevada's sovereignty is
not dependent on a provision which can be easily overridden by a joint
resolution of Congress. Also, Nevada's lack of political strength, which
the Watkins Court premised on the "Great Compromise of 1787", does not
mean that the other states, acting through the federal government, can
force Nevada to accept a national repository against its will. The Tenth
Amendment makes it clear that, irrespective of the NWPA's state
disapproval provision and the "Great Compromise of 1787", the federal
government must respect the legitimate interests of the states. Indeed,
Nevada has a legitimate interest to protect the health, safety, and general
welfare of its citizens, from the permanent storage of the nation's
high-level nuclear waste within its borders that cannot be compromised
by the federal government.
If the federal government is permitted to site a high-level nuclear
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waste repository in Nevada without Nevada's approval, such an action
would clearly violate Tenth Amendment and federalism principles. In
South Carolina v. Baker,"M the Supreme Court suggested that Tenth
Amendment judicial review would be available to a state if there was a
defect in the political process. This defect, procedural or not, would be
evident if the federal government sites a repository at Yucca Mountain
over Nevada's objection. Therefore, under Baker, Tenth Amendment
judicial review should be available to Nevada in order to maintain and
protect Nevada's sovereignty interest from the federal government's
intent to site a repository at Yucca Mountain. The political process cannot
do this.
CONCLUSION
Nevada v. Watkins illustrates the federalism problems faced by the
federal government in trying to site the nation's only high-level nuclear
waste repository within a single state. Prior to Congress' 1987 NWPA
amendments which completely redirected the nation's entire high-level
nuclear waste toward Yucca Mountain, Nevada, no state had been willing
to accept a national repository. With the 1987 amendments, though,
Nevada has been left to bear the burden of a program avoided by all
states. States which do not want a repository and states with large
amounts of high-level nuclear waste will benefit from the NWPA's
amendment at the sole expense of Nevada. If the federal government sites
a repository in Nevada against Nevada's approval, then Nevada would
be forced to undertake a repository only for federal interests. The Tenth
Amendment preserves Nevada's state sovereignty interest within the
federal system and guarantees Nevada the right to restrict the federal
government from requiring Nevada to house a repository. As Justice
O'Connor stated, "[The] true 'essence' of federalism is that the States as
States have legitimate interests which the National Government is bound
to respect even though its laws are supreme."47
Sonny Swazo
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